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In 1948, after being tested at the biological
rarfare testing center at Camp Dietrick and on the dande-
ions in the Mall in Washington, the phenoxy herbicide,
!,4,5-trichlorophenoxy acetic acid (2,4,5-T) was released as
i registered herbicide. / Only one year later, after
roduction was set full scale, 228 workers at a Monsanto
t,4,5-T plant developed chloracne 2/ and four more serious,
-ndustrial accidents related to 2,4,5-T occurred over the
iext ten years worldwide. 3_/ In spite of its nearly unsuc-
:essful beginning, 2,4,5-T has since been used extensively
n the Vietnam War, incorporated into 424 registered prod-
icts which contain a total of 5.4 kg 2,3,5-T 4/ and survived
)n the market for over 30 years, with its cancellation
finalized only this spring (1985). The reason for this
Lelay cannot be explained away by government incompetence,
iowever, but evolves from a much more complex problem with
ts center in the political/bureaucratic inability to act
rhen the science is uncertain.
.i/ D. Davis, Herbicides In Peace and War, 29 BIOSCIENCE
10, 91 (1979).
2 T. Whiteside, A Reporter at Large: The Pendulum and
:he Toxic Cloud, NEW YORKER, 25 July: 30, 39 (1977).
.2/ An explosion occurred in a 2,4,5-T factory in
1. Germany, in Amsterdam, in Czechoslovakia, and 70 workers
Lt a Dow 2,4,5-T factory developed cases of chloracne. Id.
A/ A. Galston, Herbicides: A Mixed BlessinQ, 29
IOSCIENCE 85 (1979).
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact
of these elusive scientific issues on the administrative
process using 2,4,5-T as a case study. The controversy over
2,4,5-T provides an excellent forum for investigation, due
not only to the uncertain biological effects of the chemical
but also because of the considerable public attention which
2,4,5-T received, particularly with respect to the Vietnam
veteran's case, where veterans sued the chemical companies
for damages suffered from warfare spraying. The paper is
broken down into three sections. The first explores the
actual science of 2,4,5-T and sets forth the fundamental
problem--the science is unpreventably inconclusive. The
second follows the acrobatic bureaucratics of 2,4,5-T
regulation when the agency is confronted with this unstable
scientific base. The third undertakes a brief analysis of
the trans-scientific issues and resulting legal complica-
tions and forwards suggestions for more effective action in
the future.
I. THE FOUNDATION OF THE PROBLEM--A TRANS-SCIENTIFIC ISSUE
2,4,5-T is a herbicide in the more general family
of phenoxy acids, which are widely used on agricultural
lands, forests, rangelands, and aquatic habitats, as well as
on industrial and urban sites. The chemical is produced via
a two-step process, with the second step conducive to the
formation of chlorinated dioxins as by-products, including
2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD), one of the most
toxic substances known to man. / Generally, pure 2,4,5-T
is not teratogenic / unless the animal (extrapolated to
humans) consumes physically impossible quantities of food
and drink: 2/
"Based on presently available data, there is no
good evidence that suggests that presently
5/ A. Galston, supra at note 4, at 86.
6/ Tendency to promote birth defects.
7/ Davis, supra at note 1, at 93.
manufactured 2,4,5-T, if used according to direc-
tions on the label, is significantly hazardous to
man, his animals, or wildlife." a/
Combined with its impurity, dioxin, some impacts have been
observed, however, with 2,4,5-T causing health and environ-
mental damage in short-term, highly concentrated conditions
such as the occupational accidents mentioned previously, or
in accidental 2,4,5-T spills. In contrast, no studies have
been done which are capable of indicating the health impacts
following a more long-term, less concentrated exposure to
the chemical.
The reason for this gap in the research concerning
the effects of 2,4,5-T is due to the difficulty in perform-
ing the type of scientific experiments required. In examin-
ing the effects of a substance such as 2,4,5-T on health,
studies must be used which are not models of the real world.
Instead, they are controlled simulations of one variable in
that world and its effects. This inability of science to
develop experiments which can answer certain pressing
questions put to it is known as "trans-science". In the
case of 2,4,5-T, carrying out the definitive study would
require examination of the effects of the herbicide on largb
populations at various low concentrations over a period of
20 to 50 years. In addition, control populations would have
to be isolated which were identical to those populations
exposed in order to eliminate the effects of all other
variables. Resulting statistics would indicate certain
correlations between cause and resulting injuries. Obviously
such a study is impossible at present, and instead we must
be content with controlled lab studies on mammals, inadequate
clinical reports from the field, with no effective method of
isolating the crucial variables, or inconclusive epidemio-
logical data. The interpretations and extrapolations from
these less definitive studies, then, provide the basis, in
most cases, for any understanding of possible effects and
consequences of the addition, removal, or alteration of one
acting variable in the system. In reality, the choices
Id. at 94. See also CAST. The Phenoxy Herbicides,
Report No. 39, Council Agr. Sci. Technol., Dept. Agron.,
Iowa State University, Ames, IA (1975); Committee on the
Effects of Herbicides in Vietnam. The Effects of Herbicides
in South Vietnam, Part A. Summary and Conclusions. National
Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C. (1974).
involved with regard to these extrapolations and assumptions
are not merely scientific, but hinge on the scientist's own
psychology and risk adversity as well.
Alvin Weinberg, a radiation specialist at Oak
Ridge Laboratory, stated this most eloquently in regard to
2,4,5-T:
"The point missed . . . is that the seemingly
simple question 'What is the effect on human
health of very low levels of physical insult?' can
be stated in scientific terms; it can, so to
speak, be asked of science, yet it cannot be
answered by science. I have . . . proposed the
name trans-scientific for such questions that
seemingly are part of science yet in fact tran-
scend science--that is, are incapable of resolu-
tion by science . . . [Even] any null experiment--
that is, an experiment that shows no biological
effect at low levels of insult--does not prove the
insult is harmless, since a larger experiment
might show effects . . . I must stress that where
low-level effects are concerned, there will always
be a trans-scientific residue. To decide on
standards when science can say neither yea or nay
requires some procedure other than the one usually
used by scientists in resolving bona fide scienti-
fic questions." 9/
In administrative law the fundamental danger is
the use of this unresolvable, uncertain "science" in a
decision making or an adversarial system which bases its
outcome on the most appropriate interpretation of the facts.
When there are no facts and only trans-scientific observa-
tions, the scientific results begin to enter an every-man's
realm where they can be interpreted in the most politically
expedient way, depending on the desired outcome.
"The vacuum of reliable scientific knowledge is
such that each side can find scientists who will
maintain in courts, in public hearings or in the
scientific literature whatever is politically
convenient, and it is important to recognize that
9/ A. Weinberg, Letters to the Editor, 174 SCIENCE 546-547
(1971).
scientists on both sides of this debate now have
career interests at stake in it." 10/
There are a variety of complications associated
with trans-science, each revolving around an unresolvability
and lack of adequate data upon which to base a conclusion.
These add still another level of complexity to any finding
of cause and effect. For the sake of clarity, three have
been defined, and each will be considered separately.
The first involves the variability between sub-
stances in how trans-scientific they are. Not all of the
substances considered in toxic torts are equally trans-
scientific, and some are not trans-scientific in any way.
Certain qualities of a chemical or the research existing on
its impact on health exert great influence on the level of
certainty regarding that substance. For example, if the
substance is exceedingly toxic, like dioxin, it may be
rather easily determined that no level is safe, or similar-
ly, if a substance is deemed to be of a highly nonreactive
nature due to its stable chemical structure, it may be
considered safe at any level. A substance also may not
belong to the trans-scientific realm if its safety has been
established by its nonthreatening presence in the environ-
ment for long periods of time and adequate data has been
gathered to substantiate that. Although this proof of
safety by default is not definitive, data gathered under
natural conditions over long periods of time is generally
more reliable than extrapolations based on short-term
laboratory studies where errors accumulate with the numbers
of extrapolations. Finally, certain substances by their
very nature have impacts which are so straightforward that
research on potential hazards may be conducted relatively
easily. For example, many tests l1/ have been developed to
determine carcinogenicity. Although they are not foolproof,
they are streamlined enough to catch many of the more
hazardous substances. In contrast, the effects of a sub-
stance on general physiology, such as respiratory clearance
1/ Peto, "Distorting the Epidemiology of Cancer: The
Need for a More Balanced Overview," 284 NATURE 297 (1980).
l_/ I.e., the Ames test on bacteria. Scientists have also
been able to isolate certain animals which are susceptible
to specific cancers in a manner similar to humans. See
S. Epstein, "The Politics of Cancer" (1979).
rates, or the teratogenic effects of a substance following
dermal exposure are much more difficult to detect, and thus
tend to be more unresolvable or trans-scientific. In
summary, it appears that the degree of uncertainty or
trans-scientific residue which may be associated with
particular substances must be considered on an individual
basis, depending largely upon characteristics and physical
properties of the chemical; the previous data collected in
the field; and the nature of the impact commonly associated
with that type of chemical.
A second trans-scientific problem emerges when
substances are involved that inflict diseases which are not
specific to that particular chemical but instead have a high
probability of natural occurrence or are "indeterminant".
While epidemiological studies are capable of detecting an
enhanced risk caused by a specific substance, they cannot
move beyond the probabilities to provide more specific
evidence for a direct causal link between a specific injury
and exposure to a substance. For both asbestos and DES the
injuries were unusual and specific to that particular
substance so that the proof of mesothelioma or adenocarcinoma
coupled with exposure to the substance, indicated an almost
undeniable link. In the case of most other substances, such
as 2,4,5-T, radiation, indoor air pollutants, and hazardous
wastes, the injuries which are inflicted are not specific to
that substance, and instead are common in the everyday
world. This makes it impossible in most cases to trace the
injury to any singular cause.
Finally, a trans-scientific condition is created
when a substantial lag time, averaging several decades, is
experienced before any injury becomes apparent following use
or exposure to a hazardous substance. This causes obvious
problems in determining the associated dangers of a chemical,
since during this lag time the evidence, data, and other
records regarding the duration or extent of exposure may be
lost or confused.
In the section following, which traces the history
of 2,4,5-T regulation, one should keep these characteristics
of trans-scientific issues clearly in mind. The scientific
debates and agency indecisiveness appear to revolve univer-
sally around the theme of "inadequate". This criticism is
not meant in the more common sense of flawed scientific
studies which are conducted in dirty labs by incompetent
scientists, however, but instead emerges from a fundamental
disagreement over the correct assumptions for the experi-
mental design or the proper risks to be considered.
Consequently, disputes focused more on the initial study set
up and subsequent interpretation than what actually went on
in lab and other reproducibility questions. Simply put--all
of the scientific controversy concerned unresolvable questions.
The implications for agency action are startling,
with the EPA having no arguable or judicially reviewable
basis for any choice it makes. In fact, Ruckelshaus and
Miller were reported to be ". . . surprised to find that
scientists could disagree among themselves as much as
lawyers do." 12/ As the following section will illustrate,
the end result for the EPA when faced with these circum-
stances was either to withdraw decisions once made, or
ultimately, to avoid ever having to make a decision at all.
II. THE BUREAUCRATICS OF 2,4,5-T REGULATION
A. The Hypothesis Stage: Controversy Over the
Dangers of 2.4.5-T
1. The Bionetics Study and its Reverberations.
In spite of the various outbreaks of chloracne and
other associated symptoms following industrial explosions,
concern over 2,4,5-T and TCDD was not expressed until the
late 1960's, when testing by the Bionetics Research Labo-
ratories indicated that offspring of mice and rats given
relatively large oral doses of 2,4,5-T during early stages
of pregnancy showed a higher than expected number of defor-
mities. Based on this, 13/ Dr. Lee DuBridge, Science
L2/ Wade, Decision on 2,4,5-T. Leaked Reports Compel
Regulatory Decision, 173 SCIENCE 610, 612 (1971).
i/ Although no acknowledgement was made, various other
studies done concurrently also suggested that 2,4,5-T was
hazardous. For example, reports of dioxin impurities in
2,4,5-T were published in major scientific journals such as
Medical World News and Nature. [11 MEDICAL WORLD NEWS,
No. 9. pp. 15-17 (1970); 226 NATURE 309-311 (1970).] In
addition, reports were published in the Saigon press of new
and unexplained birth abnormalities starting in 1967, when
the spraying program in Vietnam became massive. They blamed
the increases on the chemical used for defoliation.
[Whiteside, THE NEW YORKER, February 7, p. 32 and March 14,
p. 124 (1970).]
Advisor to President Nixon and Executive Secretary of the
President's Environmental Quality Council, announced on
October 29, 1969, the discontinuance of most 2,4,5-T uses. L4/
. .. although it seems impossible that any
person could receive harmful amounts of this
chemical from any of the existing uses of 2,4,5-T,
and while the relationships of these effects in
laboratory animals to effects in man are not
entirely clear at this time, the actions taken
will assure safety of the public while further
evidence is being sought." 15/
Early the following year, in 1970, hearings on the
environmental and health effects of 2,4,5-T were held before
the Senate Subcommittee on Energy, Natural Resources, and
the Environment with the honorable Philip Hart of Michigan
presiding. 16/ In April of that same year, the Secretaries
of Agriculture, Interior, and Health, Education, and Welfare
issued a joint suspension / of the registration of 2,4,5-T
for all aquatic uses and liquid formulations for home and
recreation. 18/ Only one month later, the secretaries
14/ The Bionetics testing was actually completed in 1966,
but was not released until 1969, when it was allegedly
leaked to the press via one of "Nader's Raiders". (The
suggestion was made that the USDA was trying to hide the
results.) [Davis, supra at note 1, at 93.]
15/ Bovey and Young, The Science of 2.4,5-T and Associated
Phenoxy Herbicides, at 109 (1980).
16 Id. at 13.
17/ Under the FIFRA statutory scheme in effect at the
time, suspension required a finding of imminent hazard to
the public. This was a more drastic measure than
cancellation, which became effective only 30 days after
service and could be delayed by a request for a public
hearing or referral to an advisory committee. 7 U.S.C.
§ 135b(c), as amended by Act of May 12, 1964.
l8/ Davis, supra at note 1.
cancelled L9/ all 2,4,5-T uses on food crops intended for
human consumption and all granular formulations of the
herbicide used for home and recreational use, basing their
decision on the Bionetics teratogenic study and an attempt
to minimize the environmental impact:
"The actions recommended for suspension and
cancellation will minimize the probability of
exposure of pregnant women to hazardous exposure
of 2,4,5-T or contaminant dioxin around the home,
in aquatic areas, and through food and water." 20/
That following November, Dow and Hercules Powder
Co., both large manufacturers of 2,4,5-T, submitted a
petition to the USDA Hearing Clerk appealing the cancella-
tion of the registration for rice, a major food crop treated
with 2,4,5-T, and requested referral to an advisory commit-
tee to investigate the scientific data available on the
effects of 2,4,5-T. 2!/ One of the major sources of debate
revolved around legitimate criticisms of the quality of
research in the Bionetics study, the same study which had
initiated the whole suspension and cancellation process.
Suspicion was stimulated still further by the companies'
suggestion that the 2,4,5-T used in the Bionetics study was
contaminated by high concentrations of dioxin. At the time
of research it was already known that the contaminant TCDD
was highly toxic when administered to laboratory animals or
allowed at too high a concentration in the finished 2,4,5-T
product. Further investigations in fact revealed that the
2,4,5-T used in the Bionetics study was produced by a
manufacturer who had since stopped production. The product
contained approximately 31 ppm TCDD, well in excess of
19J Cancellation orders have no effect on the
manufacturer's right to ship and market its product until
the administrative cancellation process has been completed
and the ultimate decision is adverse. (Dow Chemical Company
v. Ruckelshaus, 477 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1973)).
20J Id. at 1319.
2/ Two other producers, Amchem, Inc., and Thompson
Hayward Chemical Co., invoked their statutory right to a
public hearing to review the cancellation order, but the
hearing was deferred pending the scientific advisory
committee report. 36 Fed. Reg. 14777 (1971).
levels considered safe for workers involved in manufacturing
(Dow was down to 0.1 ppm). 22/
Although use of the highly contaminated 2,4,5-T in
the Bionetics study was characterized as a major flaw in the
experiment, this oversight may be attributed more to the
failure of the scientists to realize exactly what they were
testing or, in scientific terms, to formulate a workable
hypothesis than to incompetent or unqualified scientists.
Obviously, little was known about the effects of 2,4,5-T at
the time of this initial testing, and the scientists, both
government and industrial, may have been pushed into research
before the experiments could be adequately designed, if at
all.
Another interpretation is possible as well. While
testing for the toxicity of a substance, many scientists
prefer to use a worst case experimental design. Although
this motive was never articulated, it is highly probable
that use of a contaminated 2,4,5-T was a conscious choice to
ascertain whether even the worst case analysis would produce
evidence of a hazard at the outset of the research. Since
the Bionetics Lab did detect effects, it may have been
22/ Dow labs proceeded to repeat the Bionetics studies
using their own regular production grade 2,4,5-T and
concluded that this concentration of TCDD in the finished
2,4,5-T did not cause birth defects in rats or rabbits at
relatively high doses during gestations. (Bovey and Young,
supra at note 15.)
Although this criticism of the Bionetics study
played a large part in the future political decision-making
by severely weakening the government's evidentiary support
for its actions, Dow's and Hercules's attempts at research
were laden with scientific flaws as well. A National
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) repeat of
the Bionetics study was conducted at the same time as the
Dow and Hercules tests. These studies found that pure
2,4,5-T (less than 0.5 ppm dioxin) did reveal birth defects
in rats. When Hercules again objected; its data was
reviewed, and it was discovered that the Hercules scientists
had made a mistake with a decimal point; they had fed their
rats with one tenth of the dose of 2,4,5-T used in the NIEHS
study. (Wade, su ra at note 12.)
holding back the public presentation of its study until more
reasonable, industrial grade 2,4,5-T was researched.
2. The Advisory Committee Report.
As required by statute, an Advisory Committee was
established by the Senate to investigate the problem. The
nine-member Committee, chosen by the Secretary of Agricul-
ure, submitted its report to the Administrator of the EPA
)n May 7, 1971, 23/ in which it recommended that registra-
-ions for 2,4,5-T use be limited to 0.5 dioxin concentra-
:ions for existing stores, and 0.1 ppm for newly manufac-
:ured 2,4,5-T. 24/
At the same time, the regulation of pesticides was
:ransferred from the USDA to the EPA effective December 2,
1970. 25! Rather than following the traditional USDA policy
)f suppressing reports, even after an official decision on
:heir recommendations had been taken, Mr. Ruckelshaus, the
3PA Administrator at the time who had inherited the task of
Desticide regulation, ordered that all reports of scientific
idvisory committees on pesticides be made public as soon as
:hey were completed. 26/
Upon its release in June, then, the report served
ilmost as a lightning rod, airing the controversy and
lisagreement within the scientific community over the
Eundamental issue of whether 2,4,5-T was dangerous at all.
)ne scientist 27/ concluded that no basis could be found for
23/ Office of Science and Technology, Report on 2.4.5-T:
k Report of the Herbicides of the President's Science
kdvisory Committee. March 1971.
24/ This determination was based on a review of all
relevant scientific studies, including the pattern of use,
environmental absorption and breakdown, pathways in animals,
toxicity tests, and reports concerning congenital
malformation in children. 36 Fed. Reg. 14777 (1971).
2 Bovey and Young, supra at note 15, at 16.
26j Wade, supra at note 12.
2/ J. G. Wilson, Causes of Developmental Abnormality.
(Footnote Continued)
regarding 2,4,5-T as teratogenic in man. He asserted that
none of the recent adequately controlled studies relating to
this subject presented data indicating that this herbicide,
as presently marketed, posed any risk to any aspect of human
reproduction under likely conditions of exposure. 28/ In
addition, many groups, such as the Society of Toxicology,
agreed with the committee's findings:
"Let us assure you that the 'verdict' of the
committee does indeed represent the majority view
of toxicologists." 29/ "Certainly much of the
concern over the continued use of phenoxy herbicide
has centered on the presence of toxic chlorinated
dibenzo-p-dioxins (dioxins) as contaminants. The
dioxin impurities, especially TCDD (although
highly toxic itself), do not appear to alter the
toxicity of 2,4,5-T . . . to animals using present
standards of 0.1 ppm or less of TCDD in the
finished product." 30/
In contrast, other scientists, primarily those
whose careers were associated with more long-term goals such
as the detection of cancer, objected strenuously:
"[t]here is sufficient apparent evidence of
adverse reproductive effects in Vietnam following
exposure to herbicides to indicate the need for
continued and expanded investigation . . . Some in
vitro tests suggest that dioxin, a contaminant
associated with the phenoxy herbicide 2,4,5-T, is
a mutagen and thus perhaps as well a mammalian
(including human) carcinogen. Direct tests for
dioxin carcinogenicity using rodents have con-
firmed that the chemical does cause cancer in
animals, but whether it does so in humans has not
(Footnote Continued)
Pesticides. In Environmental and Birth Defects.
Environmental Sciences. 79 (1973).
28/ Bovey and Young, supra at note 15.
29/ Society of Toxicologists, Letters, 174 SCIENCE 546
(1971).
30/ Bovey and Young, supra at note 15, at 450-451.
as yet been established . . Careful follow-up
studies are recommended." 1/
knother particularly vocal group, the Committee for Environ-
nental Information (CEI), claimed that the report relied
aeavily on unpublished data, ignored other relevant data,
and was replete with "unwarranted assumptions . . . many of
the experiments the study relied upon were simply not
sophisticated enough to supply a basis for judgments". 3_2
More specific criticisms were levied by a reporter
for SCIENCE who asserted that the committee essentially
relied on two unproved assumptions: 1) that there is a "no
effect" level of 2,4,5-T and dioxin and 2) the substances do
not accumulate in the environment and in food chains. The
unproved status of these assumptions completely invalidated
or at least made the report inadequate. Mr. Sterling, the
only dissenter in the results reached by the Advisory
Committee, also asserted that the committee's mistaken
impressions and the resulting assumptions could be largely
attributed to the bad design of the relevant experiments,
many of which either failed to study the effects of small
doses (less than 100 kg) of 2,4,5-T, or used too few animals
to show an effect. 23/
Finally, another source of dispute was the level
of validity awarded to "suggestive but not definitive"
studies. The committee had largely discounted any value in
the results 34 of Vietnam studies conducted by Meselson
under AAAS grants, 35/ asserting that they were " .
predestined to failure" due to the complexity of variables,
the reliance on unsupported extrapolations, the incomplete-
ness of existing records.
21/ A. H. Westing, ed. Herbicides in War: The Long-Term
Ecological and Human Consequences, at 148 and 164 (1984).
22/ C. Holden, Critics Weigh EPA Herbicide Report, Find it
Wanting, 173 SCIENCE 312 (1971).
23J Wade, supra at note 12.
24/ Reported by Wade, id.
2/ See note 56.
Close review of these scientific debates, however,
reveals that criticisms were generally not based on a claim
of ignorance or incompetence of the opposing side, but
instead on differing interpretations or scientific philoso-
phies for the same problem. At the heart of the debates lay
the trans-scientific nature of the 2,4,5-T issue, where
scientific data conflicted and no satisfactory experiments
could be conducted which could provide some basis for the
interpretations and hypothesizing. Harrison Wellor of the
Nader Center characterized the problem best: The subject of
2,4,5-T:
"has become a battlegound of opposing philosophies
about the relationship between technological risk
and human safety. Arrayed on one side . . . are
typically . . . the classical toxicologists, food
technologists and agrichemical engineers, who are
trained to look for the short-term effects of
pesticides, both in their impact on the human body
and on the pests in the field. On the other side
are typically the microbiologists and geneticists,
the specialists in the causes of cancer, birth
defects and mutations, who are professionally
concerned with the long-term effects of chemical
contaminants on human health. At stake is the
question of who is to set the standards upon which
the proposed safety of a pesticide (or any chemi-
cal) is to be judged." 36/
A claim of bias in the choice of the committee
members for the Scientific Advisory Panel further confused
the scientific loyalties engendered in the dispute. Investi-
gations revealed that the Secretary of Agriculture, not the
EPA Administrator, chose the committee members. It was also
discovered that no attempts were made to prevent bias in the
selection process, and the committee members were screened
as to their financial interest only. In fact, when supplied
with a list of names by the Academy of Science, the USDA
requested additional lists due to the lack of pharmacologists,
and oncologists in the first list. 37/ Furthermore, the
USDA interpreted the FIFRA provision, which stipulates that
the advisory committees "shall be composed of experts
36! Wade, supra at note 12, at 614.
37/ Id.
selected by the National Academy of Sciences" to mean that
the Academy would supply the names and the department would
choose the committee. This serves as still another example
of the importance of a scientist's specific career interests,
whether it be the solution of short-term crises or the
solution of more longer-term problems, in coloring his
conclusions.
Clearly, this disclosure of the report, whether
deliberate 1/ or inadvertent, complicated Ruckelshaus's
final decision with its concomitant scientific uproar. 39
,Consequently, confronted with the realms of outside criti-
cism Ruckelshaus rejected the committee's report and ordered
the cancellation to remain in effect until the next and
final stage in the appeals process; a public hearing to be
held in the fall: 40/ In the official Determination and
Order of August 6, 1971, the EPA acknowledged the advisory
committee report, highlighting the fact that "the committee
:ound that the data concerning the effects on human beings
I.n exposed areas was inconclusive". 4/
28 It is possible that Ruckelshaus's policy of making
::eports public was motivated by the desire to air all USDA
biases and allow the EPA to act more objectively in
:egulating the herbicide. In fact, Wade concluded: "At two
,rucial points . . . the intervention of outside scientists
.ias been essential in keeping the government machinery on
:he rails and in motion. And only through by-passing the
2xisting machinery of the advisory committee's report and
:he review of it by the EPA Office of Pesticides did
Zuckelshaus and his aides arrive at the correct decision to
.naintain the existing restrictions." (Id. at 615.)
39/ Id.
A 4Q/ The hearing process also continued to further
EZuckelshaus's implications that outside scientists were
invaluable in reaching an objective decision: "While this
igency could undertake to create these studies and compile
in informal record which could be the basis for the required
Eindings, the agency believes this evidence should be
jathered through an open public hearing." 36 Fed. Reg. at
L4777 (1971).
A1/ Id.
3. The Dow Challenge to the EPA's Interpretation
of Uncertain Science.
Dow immediately challenged this order, A2/ assert-
ing that it did not comply with the requirements of Sec-
tion 4(c). Since the record was admittedly incomplete, the
order "purported to order a public hearing" to gather fur-
ther data and did not "set forth the findings of facts" re-
quired by statute. 43/
The Administrator, although noting that there was
no provision under FIFRA with which to grant Dow relief,
nevertheless treated Dow's challenge as a "petition for
reconsideration" and reaffirmed the conclusions:
"The basis for my August 6 determination to
continue the order of cancellation previously
issued was the many questions I had concerning the
safety of and need for 2,4,5-T. Specifically,
that action was mandated by the following facts."
The Administrator then proceeded to list ten items A4/ of
uncertainty, which he found weighed heavily in favor of
42/ The motion requested withdrawal of the August 6 order
and the entry of a new order complying with the statute.
Dow also, under protest, filed objections to the order and
requested a hearing. (Dow, 477 F.2d at 1320.)
43/ Id.
44/ "1. A contaminant of 2,4,5-T--tetrachlorodi-
benzoparadioxin (TCDD, or dioxin)--is one of the most
teratogenic chemicals known. The registrants have not
established that one part per million of this contami-
nant--or even 0.1 ppm--in 2,4,5-T does not pose a danger to
the public health and safety.
2. There is a substantial possibility that even
'pure' 2,4,5-T is itself a hazard to man and the
environment.
3. The dose-response curves for 2,4,5-T and
dioxin have not been determined, and the possibility of 'no
effect' levels for these chemicals is only a matter of
conjecture at this time.
4. As with another well-known teratogen,
(Footnote Continued)
cancellation. Once again, it was the interpretation of this
uncertainty which was in dispute--not a disagreement over
the original facts or resolvable scientific issues.
Following this reaffirmation, Dow filed an action
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Arkansas seeking injunctive and other relief against the
.decision. Dow argued that the Administrator was acting
contrary to the statute and a finding of fact was necessary
(Footnote Continued)
:thalidomide, the possibility exists that dioxin may be many
:imes more potent in humans than in test animals
(thalidomide was 60 times more dangerous to humans than to
mice, and 700 times more dangerous than to hamsters; the
usual margin of safety for humans is set at one-tenth the
:eratogenic level in test animals).
5. The registrants have not established that
dioxin and 2,4,5-T do not accumulate in body tissues. If
Dne or both does accumulate, even small doses could build up
to dangerous levels within man and animals, and possibly in
the food chain as well.
6. The question of whether there are other
sources of dioxin in the environment has not been fully
axplored. Such other sources, when added to the amount of
lioxin from 2,4,5-T, could result in a substantial total
Dody burden for certain segments of the population.
7. The registrants have not established that
there is no danger from dioxins other than TCDD, such as the
aexa- and hepta-dioxin isomers, which also can be present in
2,4,5-T, and which are known to be teratogenic.
8. There is evidence that the polychlorophenols
in 2,4,5-T may decompose into dioxin when exposed to high
temperatures, such as might occur with incineration or even
in the cooking of food.
9. Studies of medical records in Vietnam
iospitals and clinics below the district capital level
suggest a correlation between the spraying of 2,4,5-T
lefoliant and the incidence of birth defects.
10. The registrants have not established the need
• or 2,4,5-T in light of the above-mentioned risks. Benefits
Erom 2,4,5-T should be determined at a public hearing, but
tentative studies by this agency have shown little necessity
Eor those uses of 2,4,5-T which are now at issue."
Dow, 477 F.2d at note 14.
before the registration of 2,4,5-T was cancelled. A/ The
District Court agreed with Dow that the Administrator was
not following proper statutory procedure in rejecting the
Advisory Committee Report: In their suggestion the court
asked that the Administrator enter a new order " . . . as
the statute requires of making findings from the Advisory
committee report". 46/
In compliance with the district court's recommen-
dation, the Administrator issued an additional order on
April 13, 1972, repeating previous conclusions and continu-
ing the cancellation order. The ten findings of fact were
set forth again (see ftn. 44), with the conclusion that:
"These facts made it abundantly clear to me that
the registrants have not met their burden of
proof, i.e., their continuing obligation to
establish the elements necessary to entitle their
products to registration . . . Accordingly the
cancellations must be continued." 4/
The district court found this response to be
inadequate 48/ and further directed the Administrator either
to enter a new order or amend his April 13, 1972 affirmation
requiring that, in addition, the Administrator:
"A. Set forth separately his findings of fact and
his ultimate conclusions.
B. Include . . . a reasoned statement setting
forth (i) the portions of the Advisory Committee
Report and the 'other data' being relied upon;
(ii) the manner in which defendant's findings are
based upon the Advisory Committee Report and such
'other data'; and (iii) the manner in which
defendant's ultimate conclusions are derived from
the findings."
45/ Id. at 1324.
46/ Id. at 1321.
A/ Id. at 1321.
48/ Id. at 1322.
49/ Id.
The district court then directed that all further EPA
proceedings be held in status quo until an order was entered
complying with the court's interpretation of FIFRA.
On appeal, the eighth circuit reversed, finding
that the Administrator had not yet entered a final order
subject to judicial review. Additionally, after reviewing
the legislative history 5O/ the court concluded that the
Administrator was not restricted to issuing:
"a cancellation order ONLY and solely upon proofs
that the substance involved does not meet the
statutory standards evolved for the safety of the
public . . Since the registrant has a continuing
burden of proof to establish that its product is
entitled to registration, . . . if the Administra-
tor has a substantial doubt as to safety, it is
his duty as well to issue the cancellation order.
And the cancellation order will remain in effect
until the registrant satisfies the Agency that
registration is warranted." 51/
In this decision, the court placed the discretion
in the administrator and the burden of proof on the manufac-
turer. Faced with the burden of proof, the manufacturer was
destined to failure, since in a trans-scientific issue such
as this, where the data and facts are grossly incomplete and
conflicting, it is virtually impossible to prove anything
definitively. In addition, rather than allowing lengthy
disputes over uncertainty, the court insisted on a brief and
complete hearing:
"We here consider a recent and largely untested
act, not without its ambiguities . . . it is a
situation of extreme complexity, interweaving
economic pressures with the most basic considera-
tions of human safety. In this situation the Act,
wisely we think, contemplates no interlocutory
50 I.e., "The legislative history supports the conclusion
that Congress intended any substantial question of safety to
trigger the issuance of cancellation notices, shifting to
the manufacturer the burden of proving the safety of his
product." EDF v. Ruckelshaus, 439 f.2d 593 (1971).
51! Dow, 477 F.2d at 1324-1325.
judicial jousting which experience has taught us
can go on for years. It was the intent of the
Congress that matters under the Act proceed
expeditiously to a final order subject to judicial
review and without judicial intervention prior
thereto. Such is our ruling." 5//
B. Establishing the Methodology to Ascertain the
Magnitude or Harm Posed by 2.4,5,-T
Following the termination of the Dow suit, the EPA
resumed its cancellation proceedings. On July 19, 1973, the
Administrator issued a notice of intent to hold a hearing 53/
on all registered uses of 2,4,5-T, including the use for
rice scheduled for April, 1974. 54/ The hearing was delayed
to permit the agency to complete an ongoing environmental
and human monitoring project on 2,4,5-T on the extent to
52/ Id. at 1326.
53/ The Administrator also added to his list of ten issues
of uncertainty, three more which would be addressed in the
hearing. These were:
1. The health hazards to man and other animals
which may be caused by 2,4,5-T and TCDD, with emphasis on
teratogenicity, other adverse reproductive effects,
mutagenicity, carcinogenity, sub-lethal chronic health
effects, and delayed lethality from chronic, low-level
exposure.
2. The extent of the health risk posed by 2,4,5-T
and TCDD, including thermal generation of additional TCDD in
the environment, persistence and bioaccumulation of 2,4,5-T
and TCDD, avenues of human and animal exposure (such as
aerial drift and water transport), accumulation of residues
in the human food supply and in human and animal tissue,
presence in 2,4,5-T of contaminants other than TCDD, other
environmental sources of dioxins, current levels of dioxins
in 2,4,5-T products, and current methods of manufacture of
2,4,5-T.
3. The necessity for the continuation of the
registered uses of 2,4,5-T.
(38 Fed. Reg. 19859-19860 (1973)).
54/ 38 Fed. Reg. 19860 (1973).
which the dioxin could adversely affect human and animal
health.
The EPA study was especially valuable since it was
intended to utilize a new, extra-sensitive dioxin detection
technique 55/ developed earlier that same year by two
Harvard scientists, Meselson and Baughman. L/ As is the
case with many new inventions, the EPA encountered dif-
ficulties with the new technique and requested additional
time before the hearings were scheduled. The request to
delay the hearing until November 1, 1974, submitted by the
Environmental Defense Fund on behalf of the EPA, was refused
by an administrative law judge in early 1974, when the
technical complications in the experiment became apparent. 57/
The EPA found administrative channels by which it could
delay the hearings however, and on May 10, 1974, issued an
order postponing the consolidated hearing until November 1,
1974, so that the hearing could be expanded to all regis-
tered herbicides derived from 2,4,5-T, including silvex and
erbon, herbicides chemically similar to 2,4,5-T and with
high TCDD contamination. 58
In spite of this increased time allowed to reach
results, the methodological problems persisted. The EPA
researchers found that their results were largely inconclu-
sive due to the numerous variables which could not be
eliminated or controlled outside of the laboratory, a plight
common to many field experiments where uncontrollable
climatic and human factors often interfere with the experi-
mental process. They concluded that definitive results
could be reached "only after a long involved period of basic
55/ It was reported to achieve accuracy in detecting TCDD
in the part per trillion range.
56 Baughman, R., and M. Meselson. 1973. Analytical
method for detecting TCDD (dioxin); levels of TCDD in
samples from Vietnam. Environ. Health Perspect. 5:27-35.
57 Bovey and Young, supra at note 15, at 19.
5R/ 39 Fed. Reg. 17466 (1974).
research investigation and idealization of instrumenta-
tion." 59!
As a result, on June 24, 1974, the EPA withdrew
the cancellation of 2,4,5-T for use on rice 60/ along with
the notice of intent to hold a public hearing on all regis-
tered uses of 2,4,5-T and other herbicides derived from
2,4,5-T. 6_1/ The statement accompanying the notice outlined
the scientific inadequacies and the resulting inability of
the agency to take action:
"The residue monitoring program was the only means
available to determine if TCDD is bioaccumulating
in man and the human food chain. Without the
answer to the question of bioaccumulation, the
danger of TCDD cannot be assessed . . . the
methodological problems have not been solved. No
date for completion of the TCDD residue monitoring
can be given, and in fact, completion of the
project by the Agency may be two or more years
away . . . Under the circumstances, it does not
seem appropriate to continue administrative
proceedings when the evidence which would largely
determine the outcome of those proceedings remains
scientifically unavailable. The Agency will
continue its TCDD residue monitoring program and
will take such further action as it deems appro-
priate once the results of the monitoring project
are available." §/
The withdrawal of the cancellation of 2,4,5-T use
on rice appears to signify a changed attitude by the agency
which previously erred in favor of safety when interpreting
59/ Cited in Citizens Against Toxic Sprays. Inc. v.
Bergland, 428 F. Supp. 908, 917 (1977).
60/ The order left all suspensions unaffected, and those
cancellations for which no hearing was requested (i.e., the
use of 2,4,5-T for granular formulations for home and
recreational use and all uses on food crops intended for
human consumption except rice. (39 Fed. Reg. 24048 (1974)).
61J Id.
62/ Id. at 24050.
uncertain scientific information. The reason for this shift
in interpretation is not clear. It could be attributed to
sheer incompetence by EPA researchers in conducting the
tests; a change of outlook on uncertainty inspired by a new
administration; a withdrawal of public support following bad
press; or a partnership or carefully guided action with Dow
and other 2,4,5-T manufacturers. Perhaps the best explana-
tion, however, may come from the shift of the burden of the
proof on the agency itself, with the requirement that the
final orders resulting from the hearings be based on fact as
indicated by the court in the previous Dow v. Ruckelshaus
suit. 6/ Faced with the burden of proving some certain and
definitive basis for its agency order, the EPA undoubtedly
felt that it had no recourse but to stall and withdraw
cancellation until the proper studies had been completed.
It should be noted that this requirement or interpretation
of FIFRA that all final orders be judicially reviewable and
based on clearly articulated fact, was a requirement which
made many cancellations impossible given the trans-scientific
nature of the questions in need of resolution and affected
many administrative decisions to follow.
C. Interpretation of Results: Controversy Over the
Implications of Controlled Animal Studies and
Inconclusive Epidemioloqy Studies
The EPA monitoring program continued following the
June 24, 1974 order, directed by a Dioxin Implementation
Plan issued in February 1975. 54/ The Plan emphasized
refinement of the analytical methodology, particularly in
relation to the environmental interferences which made it
difficult to assess the relevant variables. In this Plan
monitoring of TCDD in beef samples from cattle grazing in
areas of high 2,4,5-T use were emphasized most heavily. The
monitoring was conducted under the 2,4,5-T Ad Hoc Task Force
with representatives of the EPA, USDA, the Environmental
63/ Dow, 477 F.2d 1317.
64/ The Plan was created on July 25-26 at a Dioxin
Planning Conference held in Washington D.C. for those
parties interested in the withdrawn 2,4,5-T/dioxin hearings.
Bergland, 428 F. Supp. at 917.
Defense Fund, and Dow Chemical. E/ Ultimately, however,
the results were inconclusive and the study failed to
determine whether dioxin entered the food chain. §6/
At the same time that the EPA study failed in
providing proof for cancelling all uses of 2,4,5-T, research
in nongovernment laboratories began to show a definite and
immediate hazard in even the most minute concentrations of
dioxin. 6_j Prompted by these studies, the EPA began
collecting information about 2,4,5-T through its Rebuttable
Presumption Against Registration process (RPAR) 68/ in order
65/ While the EPA was investigating the effects of
2,4,5-T, a citizen subjected to USFS spraying brought suit
against the Forest Service and USDA to seek relief from an
inadequately done Environmental Impact Statement in
Bergland, id.
6/ Of the 67 beef fat samples taken from cattle grazing
in areas treated with 2,4,5-T, only eight showed any
detectable concentrations of dioxin.
67/ Allen and associates at the University of Wisconsin
fed monkeys a diet containing dioxin contaminated food at a
concentration of 500 ppt. After 12 months over 65% of the
animals contaminated had died. The study demonstrated
" . . the ability of dioxin to persist and accumulate in
the living tissues of primates." (J. R. Allen,
D. A. Busotte, F. P. VanMiller, L. J. Abrahamson, &
J. J. Lalich. Morphological changes in monkeys consuming a
diet containing low levels of 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-
p-dioxin. Food Cosmet. Toxicol. 15:401-410.) In a second
study conducted by Dr. Allen, 33 out of 60 rats fed dioxin
(as low as 5 ppt/day) developed tumors. Dr. Allen, et al.
concluded that the tumors suggested the carcinogenic
potential of dioxin. (J. P. VanMiller, J. J. Lalich, and
J. R. Allen. Increased incidence of neoplasms in rats
exposed to low concentrations of 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-
p-dioxin. CHEMOSPHERE 10:635-632. (1977).)
68 The purpose of the RPAR process is to facilitate the
identification of pesticide uses which may not satisfy the
statutory standard for registration and provide a structure
for the gathering of information about the risks and
benefits of these uses. The rebuttable presumption arises
(Footnote Continued)
to decide whether registration of the pesticide should be
continued. 69/ Based on these studies, as set forth in the
2,4,5-T Position Document prepared by the 2,4,5-T working
group of the EPA, 70/ the agency concluded that the risk
criteria 71/ relating to oncogenic effects and teratogenic
and/or ferotoxic effects in mammalian test species were
exceeded. 22/ 73 Following this notice of rebuttable
presumption, all registrants and applicants for registration
(Footnote Continued)
if a pesticide meets or exceeds any of the risk criteria set
forth in the regulations. After an RPAR is issued, all
interested persons are invited to rebut the presumption by
presenting information showing that either the agency's
determination of risk was in error or that the exposure
associated with use of the pesticide does not result in a
significant risk. (44 Fed. Reg. 72317 (1979); See also
National Research Council, RegulatinQ Pesticides. (1980)).
Although this relieves the need for strong evidence before
holding an initial cancellation hearing, the RPAR process
does nothing for reaching conclusions on uncertain science
once the hearings are in effect.
69 On-going TCDD studies continuing under the Dioxin
Implementation Plan included: An analytical method
validation study to produce statistically defensible data;
monitoring for residues in human milk in the Pacific
northwest; additional beef fat residue studies; additional
technical pesticide residue studies; and an environmental
monitoring program for TCDD residues in soil, water, and
biota. (43 Fed. Reg. 17116, 17124 (1978).)
70/ Id. at 17116.
7l/ 40 CFR 162.11(a) (3).
72/ Title 40, § 162.11 of CFR for FIFRA as amended
provides that a rebuttable presumption against registration
may arise if the Agency determines that a pesticide meets or
exceeds any of the risk criteria relating to acute and
chronic toxic effects as set forth in § 162.11(a) (3).
72/ Some data also suggested an association of 2,4,5-T
and/or TCDD with mutagenic effects in test animals and TCDD
with toxic effects in humans, but the data was not
sufficient to warrant the issuance of a Rebuttable
Presumption. (43 Fed. Reg. at 17117.)
were entitled to submit evidence to rebut the oncogenic 24/
and other chronic or delayed toxic effect presumptions 75
within 45 days. 16/ In addition, registrants were required
by law to submit to the EPA any additional information
regarding any adverse effects of the pesticide, whether
published or unpublished, pursuant to Section 6(a) (2) of
FIFRA and 40 CFR 162.8(d).
During the next ten months the Agency received
copious information about 2,4,5-T through the RPAR process.
Among the studies submitted was the pivotal report by eight
women living in the vicinity of Alsea, Oregon, who experi-
enced a total of 13 miscarriages from 1972 to 1977, which
occurred over only a four to six-week period after the
spring application of 2,4,5-T in the forest areas nearby.
"The Agency's preliminary analysis of the data . . .
indicates that:
(1) the spontaneous abortion index . . . for Alsea
study area where 2,4,5-T was used was signifi-
cantly greater than the index for the urban and
74/ Information relating to oncogenic risks must conform
with the Agency's Interim Procedures and Guidelines for
Health Risk and Economic Impact Assessment of Suspected
Carcinogens (May 25, 1976; 41 FR 21402).
75/ In case of a pesticide presumed to be toxic, the
registrant may rebut the presumption by proving that the use
is not likely to result in any significant acute adverse
effect (40 CFR 162.11(a) (4) (i)); that when considered with
proposed restrictions on use and practices of use, the
pesticide will not concentrate or persist in the environment
to levels in man likely to result in any significant chronic
adverse effects. (40 CFR 162.11(a)(4)(ii)); or the criteria
set by the agency for risk was in error (40 CFR
162.11(a)(4)(iii)). In addition, § 162.22(a) (5) (iii)
provides that a registrant may submit evidence on the
economic, social, and environmental benefits of the
pesticide use. If the risk presumptions are not rebutted,
the benefit evidence is considered by the Agency in
determining subsequent regulatory action, or if the benefits
greatly outweigh the risk additional hearings may be held
pursuant to § 6(b)(2) of FIFRA.
76/ 43 Fed. Reg. at 17117.
control areas where there was little or no known
use of 2,4,5-T;
(2) there was a dramatic increase in the sponta-
neous abortion index for the study area relative
to the urban and control areas in the months of
June and July; this increase followed, by approxi-
mately two months, a period in March and April
when 2,4,5-T was used to control vegetation in the
forested study area; and
(3) statistical analyses of these data indicate
that there was a significant correlation between
the amounts of 2,4,5-T used in the study area
during the spraying season and the subsequent
increase in the spontaneous abortion index in the
study area." 7/
The agency then concluded:
"In view of the laboratory data establishing that
2,4,5-T and its contaminant TCDD have embryolethal
effects in test animals and the susceptibility of
the young embryo to fetotoxic and teratogenic
agents, the increased spontaneous abortion index
in an area of 2,4,5-T use may reasonably be
interpreted to be a consequence of the exposure of
women residents of the area to the 2,4,5-T used
for forest management." 28/
27/ 44 Fed. Reg. 15874, 15880 (1979).
78/ Id. at 15883.
Based on this and other information, the Adminis-
trator ordered emergency 19/ suspensions of the forestry,
rights-of-way, and pasture uses 90/ of 2,4,5-T. B1/
"I am ordering emergency suspension of these uses
because I find that they pose an 'imminent haz-
ard' B2/ to humans and because I also find that an
'emergency' exists because there is not enough
time to complete a suspension hearing before the
next spraying season." 83/
In addition, as required by FIFRA Section 6(b)(1), the
Administrator issued notices of intent to cancel the regis-
trations of the suspended uses of the pesticides published
in the same issue. 84/ Hearings could be requested by
affected registrants within 30 days of the publication of
the notices in Federal Register (on March 14, 1979).
29/ In order to issue an emergency suspension, the
Administrator is required to prove that the pesticide poses
an "immiment hazard" and that an "emergency" exists; when
the situation is an immediate threat, the continuation of a
pesticide use is likely to result in unreasonable adverse
effects during a suspension hearing. Unlike an ordinary
suspension, then, an emergency suspension order is issued
without prior notice to registrants and takes effect
immediately, halting the distribution, sale, and use of
2,4,5-T for the uses specified until the completion of
further administrative proceedings. If an expedited hearinc
is requested, which must occur within five days and may onl
be requested by a registrant, the order continues until the
issuance of a final suspension order (id. at 15875).
80/ Id. at 15874.
81/ Id. at 15874. These suspended uses comprise about 74%
of the estimated 9.3 million pounds of 2,4,5-T used annually,
in the U.S. (id. at 15876).
82/ In order to find an imminent hazard, it is necessary
to find that the risks of use during the period likely to be
required for cancellation outweigh the benefits.
83/ Id. at 15874.
84/ Id. at 15874 and dated March 8, 1979.
The Alsea study, which was relied upon to establish
this sudden and definitive suspension, was much more positive
than those of the past and furthermore, was an epidemiologi-
cal study where the normal U.S. population served as the
guinea pigs. The agency's conclusions illustrate this
lrw-found confidence in their scientific evidence, now
backed by the power of a human study:
"In my judgment, the information which has recent-
ly come to my attention as a result of the Alsea
study constitutes a dramatic and troubling new
point of departure for analysis of TCDD exposure
concerns . . . " As indicated above, these data
show a striking relationship between 2,4,5-T use
and increased incidences of spontaneous abortions
among women residing in the use area. This effect
is a result which could have been predicted as a
likely outcome of human exposure, based upon
previous animal data of almost unprecedented
conclusiveness. The Alsea study contained no data
showing actual exposure. Nevertheless, concern
for the health of humans who may be exposed to
2,4,5-T and its contaminant, TCDD, was heightened
because scientists had not demonstrated that there
was a level of exposure that has no adverse
effects in humans . . . "Thus, in the face of the
highly significant relationship which the study
showed, and the animal data, I conclude it is
reasonable and in the public interest to assume
that the women in the Alsea study were exposed to
TCDD." g5/
In spite of the apparent strength of the Alsea
study, it was not long before industrial scientists attacked
'he study for failing to connect the increased incidence of
niscarriages with dioxin exposure. The EPA, without admit-
ting directly to the failings, immediately returned to the
Oregon site to collect tissue samples from affected infants
and animals. If dioxin was found in these tissues, it would
orovide the missing causal link between the 2,4,5-T spray-
.ngs in the area f/ and the abnormally high incidence of
85J Id. at 15884.
3/ The exposure would be proved by the presence of dioxin
'in human and animal tissues.
spontaneous abortions and birth defects. The results from
these studies still have not been released. 8/
Emergency suspension hearings before the agency
were commenced in May 1979 and halted when the registrants
withdrew from the proceedings. This withdrawal affirmed by
operation of law under FIFRA Section 6(c) the emergency
suspension order. Soon after, on July 9, 1979, the EPA
announced its preliminary determination for the RPAR review
of the remaining non-suspended uses. 88/ These uses includ-
ed rangeland, rice and non-crop, the uses in which the
2,4,5-T allegedly has the chance of entering the food chain.
This action was followed by referral of the Position Docu-
ment (PD 2/3), summarizing the EPA's preliminary findings,
to the Secretary of Agriculture and the FIFRA Scientific
Advisory Panel (SAP) for comment as required by Sections 6(b)
and 25(d) of FIFRA. Although not required, the agency also
opened the report up to interested parties and invited
comments. 89/
On December 3, 1979, a notice of intent to hold
hearings under FIFRA Section 6(b) (2) to determine whether to
cancel products for the remaining non-suspended end uses of
2,4,5-T was announced. 20/ Along with the announcement was
the agency's final determination to cancel the non-suspended
uses following RPAR review. In its supporting position
8! Personal communication with Michael Axline, Pacific
Northwest Resources Clinic, University of Oregon Law Center.
Mr. Axline is presently the plaintiff's attorney in a
Freedom of Information suit to acquire the results of these
studies.
W 44 Fed. Reg. 41531 (1979).
89/ 44 Fed. Reg. 72316 (1979). "Although not required to
do so under FIFRA, the Agency has determined that it is
consistent with the general theme of the RPAR process and
the Agency's overall policy of open decisionmaking to afford
registrants and other interested persons an opportunity to
comment on the bases for the proposed action during the time
that the proposed action is under review by the Secretary of'
Agriculture and the Scientific Advisory Panel." (Id. at
72317.)
90/ Id. at 72316 and 72328.
documents, the EPA did not mention its much-criticized
"Alsea study", but instead relied on a combination of animal
test data and exposure estimates to support its case. 91/
"In brief, the Agency has determined that the
potential oncogenic, fetotoxic and teratogenic
risks associated with these uses of 2,4,5-T do not
appear to be justified by offsetting economic,
social, or environmental benefits," 22/ . . . "the
Agency [then] recommends holding a hearing, in
part because the available data indicates that
these uses appear to have unreasonable adverse
effects on the environment. However, the Agency
did not act to suspend these uses as it would have
done had it had found an imminent hazard." 93/
In reviewing the agency's proposed scientific
findings, the Science Advisory Panel (SAP) disagreement came
not over the studies but over their interpretation and other
questions of public policy. The SAP expressly agreed with
the agency's choice of studies and the credence given to
them 94/ as set forth on a point-by-point basis in Appendix B
of the Federal Register Publication. 95/ But the Panel
concluded that it had found no evidence of an "immediate or
substantial hazard", 96/ and given the uncertainty and
serious scientific gaps, hearings were inappropriate at the
time. In direct opposition, the EPA insisted that hearings
9_/ Chemical Regulation Reporter pg. 1507 (12/21/79).
92/ 44 Fed. Reg. at 72316.
23/ Id. at 72323.
24' "The SAP's assessment of the scientific data on the
reproductive and the oncogenic effects of 2,4,5-T, silvex,
TCDD in test animals is generally consistent with the
Agency's position. Also, consistent with the Agency's
current efforts were several SAP recommendations for
obtaining additional data." (Id. at 72323.)
95/ Id. at 72324.
9/ The EPA conceded, in response, that had it been an
"imminent hazard", the use would have been suspended by an
emergency action. Id. at 72323.
were necessary based on the very same uncertainty which the
SAP felt made them unnecessary. 27/ Whether due to economic
loyalties or differences in training, the tension between
different scientific/technical bodies interpreting uncer-
tainty in a light most consistent with their perspective was
revealed once again. Once again, the party in control, the
EPA, had the authority to avoid potential deadlocks and
reach a decision.
In addition, this Federal register notice also
expressed a decision by the agency, later validated by EPA
Administrative Law Judge Herbert Perlman 98/ to consolidate
the hearings for non-suspended uses, pursuant to FIFRA
Section 6(b)(2), with the hearings on cancellation for
previously suspended uses, pursuant to FIFRA Sec-
tion 6(b)(1). 2/
"Not only will this action be administratively
convenient for the Agency, registrants, and
97/ "The Agency has taken the Panel's recommendations into
account but has decided that such a hearing is appropriate,
based on . . . the Agency's and the SAP's conclusion that
more information is necessary to resolve the issues
involved." Id.
28/ Chem. Regulation Reporter 12/21/79 pg. 1508.
29/ Two types of proceedings are available under
Section 6(b) of FIFRA, which it is within the sole
discretion of the Administrator to determine. If the
Administrator determines that the risks of a pesticide use
outweigh the benefits, he may issue a 6(b) (1) proceeding,
which, if there are no requests for a hearing following a
notice within a period prescribed by statute, the
cancellation takes effect automatically, by law.
If the Administrator determines that the balance
between risks and benefits is in need of further study, a
(b) (2) may be issued: "to determine whether or not its
registration should be cancelled". Unlike (b) (1), however,
Section 6(b) (2) does not include a proposed regulatory
solution which would take effect automatically if a hearing
is not requested. Thus, the hearing period will continue
until the Administrator takes a definitive action. (44 Fed.
Reg. at 72317.)
interested parties, entailing more efficient use
of resources, but it will also ensure that the
Agency's concerns on all uses of 2,4,5-T and
silvex are addressed consistently." 10/
Following several postponements i01/ the consol-
idated hearings were set for March 14, 1980, before Adminis-
trative Law Judge Edward Finch. Initially the hearings were
divided into two phases which were expected to last over a
period of two years. The first dealt only with the risks
posed by use, while the other was to consider potential
benefits. Further, the issues to be considered, distilled
from the larger PD 2/3 and PD 4 documents, led the agency to
narrow the questions for the hearing as follows:
"(1) whether the uses of 2,4,5-T on [rice; non-crop
and rangeland] generally causes unreasonable adverse
effects on the environment when used in accordance with
widespread and commonly recognized practice;
(2) whether the use of 2,4,5-T on rice, rangeland,
or non-crop areas will generally cause unreasonable
adverse effects on the environment when used in accor-
dance with widespread and commonly recognized practice
unless the terms and conditions of registration are
modified to be more restrictive than those currently in
effect;
(3) whether, if modifications to the terms and
conditions of registration are adopted, the labeling of
2,4,5-T products for these uses will comply with the
applicable provisions of FIFRA; and
(4) whether, despite modifications to the terms
and conditions of registration, the use of 2,4,5-T on
rice, rangeland, or non-crop areas will generally cause
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment when
100/ Id. at 72323.
101/ The hearings on suspended uses were begun earlier,
with four prehearing conferences held, but the active phase
of the hearings was delayed to await EPA's determination on
whether to consolidate hearings for all uses. (Chem. Reg.
Rep. 12/21/79.)
used in accordance with widespread and commonly recog-
nized practice and should thus be cancelled." 102/
As it turned out, both sides, represented almost entirely by
the EPA and Dow, presented convincing and well-prepared
evidence, including presentations by over 100 witnesses,
1,500 exhibits, and 23,000 pages of transcript.
Other developments in the hearings included a
subpoena by Dow for four studies conducted by James Allen
and the dioxin/monkey studies from the University of Wisconsin.
Dr. Allen requested that the subpoena be quashed, since a
scientist should not be required to publish before he is
satisfied with the reliability and accuracy of his data. 103/
Administrative Law Judge Finch modified the subpoena before
issuing it by directing Dr. Allen to provide documents from
recently completed studies, but only "available information"
from the ongoing studies. By EPA request, Finch did grant a
protective order preventing the parties from publicly
disclosing the data from ongoing studies. Also, not long
into the hearings, on October 24, 1980, Monsanto voluntarily
cancelled registration of all products containing 2,4,5-T,
effective December 3, 1980, thus removing itself from the
battle. ;04/
After an exhausting and inconclusive first hearing
further proceedings were suspended in March, 1981 for
settlement negotiations between Dow 105/ and the EPA.
Following the full year of presentations, the agency had
moved for settlement, apparently inspired by the threat of
many years of expensive hearings ahead. The trans-scientific
nature of the problem had clearly put the agency in this
spot. While the existing evidence was controversial and
extensive enough to warrant thousands of pages of testimony
and one full year of presentations, no resolution was in
10a/ 44 Fed. Reg. at 72319.
103/ Chem. Reg. Rep. pg. 1875 (1980).
104/ 45 Fed. Reg. 72722 (1980).
105/ Even though almost 70 other firms and associations
were involved in the cancellation hearings, Dow was the
major voice in the proceedings and spent about $10 million
fighting cancellation. (Env. Reporter pg. 1056 (1983).)
sight. Furthermore, EPA priorities made settlement almost a
necessity. The time the underfunded agency had already put
into the hearings far exceeded the herbicide's priority in
relation to other problems facing the agency.
The negotiations themselves lasted over two years
and dealt primarily with the proper methods for withdrawing
the pesticide, informing farmers and end users, etc., rather
than with the questions of scientific uncertainty which had
dominated past debates. 106/ From the EPA's perspective, by
delaying until all parties had lost interest, the EPA
avoided having to make a decision and risk having its
determinations later challenged or overturned. 127/
On October 14, 1983, four years after the initial
emergency suspension was issued, Dow ended its fight 108/
106/ Personal communication with Mark Tucker, a Dow
attorney involved in the hearings.
107/ See, i.e., Industrial Union Department v. American
Petroleum Institute, 448 US 607 (1980). Also, one of the
agency's primary concerns is precedent and avoiding any
chance of an unfavorable ruling. (Personal communication
with Pamela Rekar, General Counsel, EPA-Region 5).
108/ Although the suit is still in the courts, there is
also a claim that in the settlement Dow actually bargained
with the EPA, voluntarily cancelling all products containing
2,4,5-T in return for the promise that the EPA's follow-up
study on the original Alsea report would not be released.
(Personal communication with Michael Axline, Director of the
University of Oregon Environmental Law Clinic.) The tissue
and environmental samples were taken in 1979, as part of
Alsea Phase II, with the assurance to affected parties that
the laboratory results would be released within several
months. (C. Van Strum, A Bitter Fog (1983).) Six years
later a Freedom of Information suit was brought against the
agency in an attempt to get the results of the study, along
with some unsuccessful discovery attempts associated with a
companion EIS 2,4,5-T spraying suit. (Merrell v. Block,
No. 83-6138-E (9th Cir. 1985).)
Although the agency is slowly releasing the
information, plaintiff's lawyers (Michael Axline) did find a
(Footnote Continued)
and asked the EPA to cancel all current registrations for
Dow products containing the chemicals. Dow's withdrawal was
motivated by the unreasonable expense, particularly in light
of the relatively insignificant market value of 2,4,5-T; the
ready availability of substitutes for most 2,4,5-T uses; and
the fact that it felt the EPA was ignoring scientific
evidence so that nothing more could be done. 109/ Further-
more, the firm said that it believed that "emotional and
(Footnote Continued)
leak, communicated by a consulting toxicologist. This led
to the much publicized Table VII, released by one of the
investigators participating in the study. The Table
revealed abnormally high dioxin concentrations from the
tissue of an encephalitic child and a four-eyed cat born
during the spring spraying season in the Alsea region. (The
only possible means of dioxin exposure was through the
2,4,5-T spraying.)
The same group alleges that the primary motive for
the EPA withholding this study was the promise by Dow that
it would end all challenges immediately, hoping that all
remaining parties would quickly follow Dow's example. Dow's
interest, obviously, was fear that even if the study were
flawed in some respects, it established a dangerous causal
link between 2,4,5-T and birth defects, a fact which would
not only speed up 2,4,5-T cancellation, but also provide the
much needed epidemiological link for the pending Agent
Orange suit. This was a liability that could put Dow into
bankruptcy and the future of the nation in an equally
precarious position. In fact, information inside the
negotiations indicated that at one point--before it was
learned that Table VII had been uncovered by the public at
large--the EPA was considering revoking some of its use
cancellation notices. In any case, the agency's actions may
be attributed once again to the previous discussion of the
inability to act effectively when faced with scientific
uncertainty. Withholding information is obviously not a
valid agency action, yet the EPA's motives almost seem
justified when viewed in relation to the prevailing outside
pressures.
109/ The protests by Dow were not economical, however.
Dow viewed its challenge to the EPA as a mission to make the
agency more scientifically accountable. Since "the Agency
refused to listen", Dow realized that its protests were no
longer worthwhile. (Mark Tucker, supra at note 108.)
political concern about dioxin contamination in the herbi-
cides made it unlikely the agency could reach a purely
scientific decision on the chemicals' safety in the near
future." ii0/ Dow spokesman Terry Witt added that Dow still
maintained that 2,4,5-T was safe and that its scientific
mission was over, given the EPA's inability to receive it in
an objective light. 11/
On the same day, EPA issued an intent to cancel
all registered uses of 2,4,5-T under 9(i) (b) of FIFRA, thus
revoking the hearings to determine whether certain uses of
2,4,5-T would be cancelled. 112! This (b) (1) notice 113/
gave participants only 30 days to notify EPA if they wished
to contest the cancellation, an exceptionally heavy burden
following Dow's voluntary cancellation. If no protests were
heard within the 30 days, cancellation would be automatic
for all registrations. The new announcement also affected
end-use registrations, allowing sale and distribution of
existing end-use stocks (for non-suspended uses) only for
one year after the effective date of cancellation. 114/
In its notice, the agency strongly encouraged the
remaining industries to follow Dow's example:
"Dow's actions suggest that the incentives to
pursue this litigation may not be as great as they
were two and one-half years ago. It is reasonable
to surmise that other litigants share Dow's
perspective and may no longer be interested in
pursuing the hearing. In light of these develop-
ments, it now seems appropriate to take steps
intended to determine whether any party is
110/ Env. Rep. pg. 1056 (1983).
iiil Id.
112/ 48 Fed. Reg. 48434 (1983).
113/ In effect, replacing the Section 6(b) (2) notice with
a Section 6(b) (1) notice reaffirmed the agency's 1979
decision that the non-suspended uses cause an adverse effect
on health and the environment. (Chem. Reg. Rep. pg. 980
(10/21/83).)
114/ 48 Fed. Reg. at 48435.
interested in continuing the hearing in Dow's
absence and, if not, to bring the time-consuming
and costly adjudicatory proceeding to an end in a
manner which removes 2,4,5-T and silvex from the
market." 115/
The EPA's plea was not effective, however, and the
cancellation was contested 116/ by two separate groups of
petitioners: a coalition of 14 industry groups ll7/ in a
consolidated hearing and the Union Carbide Agricultural
Products Co. Inc. on its own. 118/ In the requests, filed
November 16 and 17, 1983, the petitioners claimed that
2,4,5-T did not present an adverse environmental effect when
used in an approved manner. They further claimed that the
notice of cancellation by the EPA in October 1983 was
"procedurally defective" since:
"it fails to provide due notice of the reasons and
factual basis and evidence in support of the
115/ Id. at 48435.
116/ 49 Fed. Reg. 5186 (1984).
117 The coalition was made up of the Celamerck GMBH & Co.
KG; Chemie Linz Ag; EM Industries Inc.; Vertac Chemical Co.;
Gilmore Inc.; The Pesticide Producers Association; The
National Cattleman's Association; The National Association
of Wheat Growers; The National Agriculture Aviation
Association; The National Agriculture Legal Fund; the
International Agriculture and Aviation Consortium;
Oregonians for Food and Shelter; The National Arborists
Association; and The Pesticide Public Policy Foundation.
118/ Interestingly, these same contesting companies had
already cancelled their registrations for certain 2,4,5-T
products indirectly by failing to submit the required data.
(This could be done by either failing to take appropriate
steps to submit an updated confidential statement of
formula, or to submit a signed confirmation that the
confidential statement of formula currently on file with
the Agency satisfies all of the requirements of the Sec-
tion 3(c)(2)(B) notice. (49 FR 7444 (2/29/84).) It is
clear, then, that this unprofitable pesticide was the symbol
of unfair cancellation based on unclear scientific evidence,
regardless of whether anyone produced it or not.
proposed cancellation of 2,4,5-T as required by
Section 6(b)(1) and the agency's regulations . . .
The notice does not contain sufficient information
to enable adversely affected persons to properly
and fully state their objections or to determine
the issues with respect to which a dispute is
raised."
Fortunately, the hearings were consolidated with
the existing 2,4,5-T proceedings in progress since 1979 and
began in 1983 with a consideration of the benefits. The
hearings lasted less than one year when the new Administra-
tive Law Judge, J. R. Greene, dismissed all parties on
January 2, 1985. 119/ This decision paralleled the prior
decision 120/ by ALJ Edward B. Finch following the EPA/Dow
settlement, in which the Judge ordered the case terminated
following the failure of any of the participating pesticide
registrants to push forward with a continued industry
challenge to the administrative cancellation efforts.
The products were formally cancelled on February 11,
1985 by operation of law when the EPA's chief judicial
officer, Ronald L. McCallum, refused to review the ALJ's
actions against the product. 121/ In the order, Ronald L.
McCallum said his decision cancelling the chemical came only
after no appeal or exceptions were filed by industries in
response to the January 2 orders by ALJ Greene to dis-
miss. 122/ Although there were accompanying complications
regarding what uses and how long sales and transport could
be continued, it appeared that Union Carbide received the
most favorable settlement, with the ability to sell and
transport its remaining stocks of non-suspended uses until
119/ In re: Union Carbide Agricultural Products. Inc.,
FIFRA No. 522.
120/ In Re: The Dow Chemical Co., FIFRA No. 415.
121/ Pesticide & Toxic Chemical News pg. 2 (2/27/85).
122, "The effect of these orders is to dismiss all
registrants and intervenors as participants in the
proceedings; to dismiss and terminate the proceedings; and
to cancel all registrations of pesticide products containing
2,4,5-T or Silvex." (Chem. Reg. Rep. pg. 1406 (3/1/85).)
November 1985. 123-/ In any case, the stocks existing by
1985 were so small that in less than a year 2,4,5-T would no
longer be legally available in the U.S. marketplace. 124/
III. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
A. Analysis
While a review of the EPA actions sheds some light
on the regulation of 2,4,5-T, a deeper understanding of the
trans-scientific dimensions of the problem is necessary
before improvements can be made. This problem, simply
stated, is that the uncertainty of science is not properly
handled by traditional administrative mechanisms. The
impacts of this trans-science as it enters the legal and
political arenas are complex and interwoven, but for the
sake of analysis three general consequences may be dis-
cerned. First, the nature of the unresolvable science
itself causes many decisions to be based on the current
state of the art of science rather than according to the
fundamental characteristics of the problem. Second, the
placement of the burden of proof, or power, has a profound
impact on the resulting regulatory policy regarding that
trans-scientific issue. Third, the nature of science,
coupled with this trans-scientific dimension, make any
interpretations of science by nonscientists largely impossi-
ble or unpredictable at best. Each of these considerations
will be treated separately.
123! Interestingly, the disposal of remaining stocks posed
more of a health and environmental problem than the actual
use. Thus, products labeled for suspended uses had to be
disposed of, while identical products labeled for other
non-suspended uses could be used until supplies were
exhausted. Obviously, the EPA placed itself in an
environmentally hypocritical position in demanding disposal
of only some of the chemical--according to the label and not
the contents. (Personal communication with Richard Wunrow,
Office of Pesticides, EPA, Region 5.)
124/ Chem. Reg. Rep. pg. 1406 (3/1/85). Attempts to
discern how much 2,4,5-T did remain in the marketplace were
met with failure, since the pesticide annual production
reports are confidential with respect to the volume still
available--even for cancelled products.
1. The Nature of the Uncertainty in Trans-Science
Obliterates the True Level of Hazard Associated
with the Issue.
In trans-scientific issues, where the hazardous
condition of a product is uncertain, there are often no
facts for the policy maker or judge to decide upon. In the
case of 2,4,5-T, determining the maximum level of human
exposure to the chemical was highly speculative, as was the
determination of environmental and health impacts following
exposure. Everything was based on interpretation, which
varied radically from one scientist to the next.
Therefore, decision on the proper regulatory
strategy for 2,4,5-T were made almost completely according
to the limitations of science, or whether science was
capable of quantifying the nature of the risks associated
with the chemical. Similarly, judicial review of the EPA's
regulations were limited by the evidence provided by the
agency and independent researchers. This reliance on the
state of the art in science to determine which actions we
choose to regulate has the ultimate effect of supporting the
validity of the regulations in a random fashion, not accord-
ing to the severity of the harm, but instead according to
the way the research is funded, and the nature and complex-
ity of the scientific question.
2. The Placement of the Burden of Proof Exerts a
Marked Influence on the Outcome of the
Resulting Decision.
In most situations an analogy can be drawn between
a party who does not have the "burden of proof" when the
issue is before the court, 125/ and the party that has the
greater political power when the issue is in the negotiating
stage. In both cases it seems that the placement of the
power, either when the opposing party has the burden of
proof, or by possessing the greatest amount of political
power, determines almost exclusively who will prevail in
trans-scientific issues, regardless of the underlying
hazards associated with the issue.
125/ It is a well established legal principle that the
party with the burden of proof in cases where the facts and
evidentiary record are incomplete is often at a severe
disadvantage.
In the case of 2,4,5-T, for example, the inconsis-
tent actions of the EPA seemed to be caused largely by the
agency's fluctuating power. At the start of the proceeding,
the EPA had little support since most participating parties
were seeking economic benefits, including the USDA, 126/ theindustries, 17 and the end-users (forest companies,
railroads, farmers). 28/ It was also at this time that the
EPA was concerned with finding effective and inexpensive
alternatives for 2,4,5-T if the product was cancelled.
Consequently, the agency, confronted with uncontrollable
impacts emerging from the one cancellation, may have been
initially hesitant to take action, particularly when the
information was as uncertain as it was. The lack of cohesion
within the government and absence of public support more
generally was also responsible for the initial EPA indeci-
siveness over the hazards of 2,4,5-T, illustrated most
clearly by the EPA Administrator's disavowal of the Scien-
tific Advisory Panel's suggestions 129/ and ultimate conclu-
sion that 2,4,5-T was not hazardous.
126/ Interestingly, the major proponents for continuing
uninterrupted use were the fellow governmental agencies in
the USDA. Adverse comments and complaints were heard around
the country against the U.S. Forest Service's spraying of
2,4,5-T. Not only did the USDA make cancellation difficult
for the EPA, but exacerbated potential danger through wide
use of the product. (See, i.e., VanStram, supra at note
110.) For example, on February 13, 1970, Congressman
Richard McCarthy of New York chaired a hearing on the
U.S.F.S. applications in the Tonto National Forest in Globe,
Arizona. (Bovey and Young, supra at note 15 at 11.)
127/ Although Dow asserted that from a business sense,
2,4,5-T was not very profitable for the company. (Mark
Tucker, supra at note 108, pers. comm.)
128/ This included the diffuse user problem, since 2,4,5-T
was incorporated into almost all agricultural and forestry
uses, even to the point of keeping the apples from dropping
off the trees early. (Personal communication with Richard
Mountfort at the Office of Pesticides, EPA headquarters.)
129/ In fact, this action occurred when the herbicide
regulation was transferred from the USDA to the EPA.
The public tide shifted several years later and
the EPA began to gain support for its cancellation efforts.
Following extensive use of the questionable pesticide on
residential areas in Oregon, 130/ all of the agencies were
sued for their failure to file an adequate environmental
impact statement. 131/ Moreover, at that same time, re-
search began uncovering equally effective and efficient
alternatives, making 2,4,5-T much less important in the
marketplace. 132/
Aside from the more localized environmental
pressures regarding 2,4,5-T spraying, the largest concern
was disposal of wastes from production of anything contain-
ing dioxin. Following Love Canal and associated disasters,
the Vertac 133/ case posed a very serious threat to con-
tinued production of 2,4,5-T. In Vertac, controversy
emerged about the best methods of cleaning up serious dioxin
spills from the industry's 2,4,5-T manufacturing process.
Release of this information to the public at large began a
tide of suspicion towards dioxin products and a tendency to
err on the side of caution.
Finally, the Vietnam veterans suit, 134/ which was
brought to recover damages for injuries sustained by the
120/ See BerQland, 428 F. Supp. 908.
13_L1/ Merrell v. Block, supra at note 110. It is
interesting to note that the district court, later overruled
by the Ninth Circuit, found that the plaintiff had not used
all of the available administrative remedies, such as
petitioning EPA to conduct special reviews or to restrict,
suspend, or cancel roadside uses. (Chem. Reg. Rep. pg. 1101
112/21/84) .)
132/ This is further verified by Dow conceding that its
challenge turned into more of a scientific mission. In
fact, long before the company entered into negotiations, the
production of 2,4,5-T had ceased. (Mark Tucker, supra at
note 108.)
133/ United States v. Vertac Chemical Corp., 489 F. Supp.
870 (1980).
134J In re "Agent Oranqe" Product Liability Litigation,
597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
spraying of Agent Orange during the war, initiated a further
tide of public suspicion and fear when it was learned that
the EPA had contemplated banning the uncertain pesticide for
over a decade. Even though causation was not resolved in
this case, 13I5 the public emotions further encouraged
cancellation. This may explain the strength and initial
excitement over the Alsea study, viewed almost as the
missing link, and the ability of the EPA to be persistent in
standing by the validity of the study even when flaws were
exposed. 136/
These events, acting in concert, served to focus
public attention in favor of strict regulation of 2,4,5-T
and provided the EPA with the necessary political sway to
invoke cancellation of the chemical. While the EPA had
taken action restricting the uses of 2,4,5-T prior to the
administrative hearings in 1981, the Vietnam veterans' suit
provided the final push for cancellation, supported by the
fact that the EPA settlement with Dow and cancellation
actions occurred simultaneously with the initial stages of
the filing of the Agent Orange complaint.
Similar to the placement of political power, the
placement of the legal burden of proof had a profound impact
on which party prevailed. More specific examples of the
influence which shifting of the burden of proof had on the
outcome of each individual debate are noted at specific
points in the narrative text. More generally, since through-
out much of the ten-year debate on 2,4,5-T regulation the
EPA was the initiator of all cancellation actions, when
challenged, they had the burden of proof in establishing the
validity of their actions and were frequently forced to
revoke their decisions due to inadequate scientific studies
and research. When the dispute moved to the courts, however,
the burden of proof was shifted to the companies who were
responsible for proving that the EPA's actions were not in
accordance with the bulk of the scientific evidence. It was
at this point, when the 2,4,5-T manufacturers sustained the
entire burden of proof in establishing that cancellation was
not appropriate, that the companies conceded, the dispute
ended, and-the cancellation was finalized.
135j Id.
136/ Richard Mountfort, supra at note 130.
Placing the burden of proof on the opposing party
or allowing one party more power generally does have some
influence on the progress and resulting decision in most
situations. In the case of trans-scientific issues, however,
where the facts are uncertain and there is a tendency to
look to all other sources for guidance, placement of the
power is determinative, or at least has a most marked
impact, on the resolution of the problem.
3. Science, By its Nature, is Not Easily Trans-
ferred to Nonscientists.
A third problem emerges when courts are forced to
evaluate and interpret scientific findings. Although review
cf administrative actions do not demand rigorous step-by-
step proof of cause and effect, the courts must nevertheless
evaluate whether, based on the incomplete and conflicting
evidence, the agency's actions or determinations are appro-
priate, not "arbitrary and capricious". Unfamiliar with the
terminology and fundamental principles, judges are forced to
rake subtle scientific distinctions between the more cer-
tain, "factual" scientific evidence and the more trans-
scientific, conjectural evidence in determining the validity
cf a regulation. While this can be done with some satisfac-
tion by the experts entrenched in the discipline, it is next
to impossible for a judge largely unfamiliar with that
science. It is at this point, when nonscientists must rely
Exclusively on scientific concepts and the current state of
the art to determine what constitutes an acceptable causal
link, that unpredictability and inconsistency begin. Simply
stated, the problem is that the uncertainty of science is
rot properly understood by nonscientists, which in turn may
le attributed to the nature of the scientific process
itself. Instead of addressing questions as they arise,
Ecience typically proceeds in a building block fashion with
(ach new question and experiment building on and guided by
the results of previous experiments. 137/ Students of
137/ Lauden, a philosopher of science, states this most
clearly: the working knowledge within a science " . .
]ationally suggests certain sorts of solutions. That is,
1here are good reasoning patterns which allow one to
(onclude, on the basis of such information, that a
]articular approach to eliminating theoretical inadequacies
:s appropriate . . . hence, whether something is regarded as
(Footnote Continued)
science immerse themselves in its concepts and "paradigms"
by practicing laboratory experiments and engaging in hypoth-
esis testing of their own. Through the span of years
scientists become familiar with the assumptions and the
limits of their discipline, and from that learn how to
assess a finding in relation to its significance and
uncertainty. 138/ Nowhere is this esoteric quality more
apparent than in the fields of toxicology and epidemiology.
The tools of research are so limited in these disciplines
that the practicing scientist not only interprets'his
results with caution but further realizes the limitations of
his discipline and can accept the necessity of the inherent
errors. 13
(Footnote Continued)
an empirical problem will depend in part, on the theories we
possess." Lauden, Progress and its Problems at 15 (1977).
138/ In his highly regarded work, the Structure of
Scientific Revolutions (1970), Thomas Kuhn emphasizes the
entrenched, almost insulated nature of scientific knowledge
and understanding: "Then imagine what the words, though all
well known, can have said to a man who did not know even the
problems." The scientist " . . . learn[s] something, prior
to the law, about the situations that nature does not
present. That sort of learning is not acquired by
exclusively verbal means. Rather it comes as one is given
words together with concrete examples of how they function
in use; nature and words are learned together . . . what
results from this process is 'tacit knowledge' which is
learned by doing science rather than by acquiring rules for
doing it." (Id. at 191.)
139/ " . . . put simplistically, a research tradition
is . . . a set of ontological and methodological 'do's' and
'don't's . . . to attempt what is forbidden by the
metaphysics and methodology of a research tradition is to
put oneself outside that tradition and to repudiate it .
what we must preserve, if we are to understand either the
logic or the history of the natural sciences, is the notion
of the integrity of a research tradition, for it is
precisely . . . that integrity which stimulates, defines and
delimits what can count as a solution to many of the most
important scientific problems." (Lauden, supra note 139, at
15.)
This interpretation is more difficult for the
nonscientist. Given his lack of familiarity with the
processes, sources of error, and the methods and tools
ultimately available, it is easy to imagine the difficulties
and frustrations he will inevitably encounter. The saccha-
:rine issue serves as an exemplary case. In that instance
scientists testing for potential cancer risks caused by
ingestion of saccharine utilized the standard acute toxic
-:esting on mice and extrapolated these results to humans.
Although the technique was based on a variety of unproven
assumptions, it was a standard well accepted within the
;cientific community and was the best that science could do.
Ultimately, the majority of FDA scientists concluded that
':he product was unsafe and should be removed from the
lnarket. Faced with the potential loss of a highly valued
product, the general populace became outraged, ridiculing
,:he extrapolations the scientists were forced to make, while
;imultaneously continuing to demand answers to unresolvable
questions and refusing to acknowledge the absence of alter-
uatives. Congress responded to the public pressure and
overrode the scientists' recommended ban.
Similarly, when this scientific decision making
Pecomes incorporated into the judicial process, it is not
rncommon to observe widespread frustration, high courtroom
:osts and expensive delays, both socially and financially.
.rudges are briefed on the basic principles of science for
reeks and proceed to grapple with sorting out the more
:ertain science from the less certain. This problem may be
;een in the 2,4,5-T issue where the judges in the hearings
,rere regarded by both sides as excellent and objective. 140/
.evertheless, much time was spent briefing the court on the
iore basic scientific concepts so that it could more effec-
ively interpret the sophisticated studies to follow. 141/
'urthermore, the studies were multidisciplinary, involving
nalytical chemistry, toxicology, epidemiology, etc., making
he analyses even more complex. Faced with only a superfi-
ial understanding of the vital scientific problems, the
udges were forced to rule on testimony solely on the basis
if its internal consistency, its reliability (published),
nd the way in which it was presented. A successful
14i/ Mark Tucker, supra at note 108.
141/ Id.
testimony, in turn required only that the scientist be
articulate, not necessarily qualified or objective.
B. Proposals for Reform
The fact that certain questions cannot be ade-
quately answered by science will not prevent their being
asked or the necessity of an answer for them. Ideally, if
decision makers were endowed with the scientists' working
knowledge of the proper tools and methodology, they would
vary the reliance they placed on scientific findings in
relation to the nature of the question asked and how compat-
ible it is with the state of science at the time. This
would, in turn, lend more direction to the traditionally
expensive, time-consuming and largely inconclusive hearings
and fact-finding sessions conducted by the agency.
If the EPA had such a policy--beyond RPAR and
extending to the substance of the hearing, not just to the
legitimacy of calling one--more satisfactory results might
be obtained. This could be achieved by categorizing the
issue according to its level of certainty: the statistical-
ly resolvable; the estimable; and the unresolvable. In each
category the content of trans-scientific residue, or uncer-
tainty, increases according to the number and nature of
extrapolations involved and the type of substance.
For substances such as 2,4,5-T, the agency could
review regulation under the unresolvable category and
conduct hearings accordingly: Rather than focusing on
conflicting studies and/or scientific perspectives, the
agency could develop a policy, based on the public's risk
adversity, for dealing with this uncertainty directly and
explicitly. In reality, in regulating 2,4,5-T, the EPA was
following an unpublished, possibly unarticulated decision t,
err on the side of caution. Had this valuation been uni-
versally recognized, agency decision making could become
more forthright, more upfront, and fairer. Judges would be
supplied with some basis for review of agency action, and
industries could plan according to these explicit rules
rather than being caught offguard by EPA delay tactics.
In most cases, however, regulatory decision maker,
and administrative law judges do not have the power to
insist on legislatively mandated standards or other more
universal regulatory policies. Perhaps the most realistic
method of managing trans-scientific issues on an individual
basis, then, is by the anticipation of problems resulting
from uncertainty. 142/ Although recognition of a problem
certainly does not solve it, it may play a large part in the
subsequent resolution of that problem.
The fact that the administrative branch today is
confronted with numerous trans-scientific issues cannot be
denied. Although most suggestions for reform involve
mechanisms beyond the reach of most of the participants in
he administrative process, hopefully this paper has estab-
ished some method for recognizing and addressing the
roblem, along with all of its legal complications. Al-
hough a reliance on this recognition may be naive or
therwise unworkable, implicit in this suggestion is the
ope that decision making concerning trans-scientific issues
ill be made more explicit and efficient in the future. EPA
egulation of 2,4,5-T serves as a clear example of past
istakes. Hopefully, it may also serve as a spring board
rom which to learn and make decision making more effective
n the future.
1A2! See, i.e., the Judge Wright insightful opinion in
'thyl Corporation v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541
.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
